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Estate of VIVIAN LINGENFELTER, Deceased. LENORE 
DEARMOND, Respondent, v. MADGE TUCKER et al., 
Appellants. 
[la, lb] Wills-Testamentary Capacity-Personal Traits and Dis-
position.-Lack of testamentary capacity is not proved by 
merely showing a few isolated acts,· foibles, idiosyncrasies, 
moral or mental irregularities or departures from the normal 
unless they bear directly on and have influenced the testa-
mentary act. 
[2] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Relation of Mental Condition to 
Execution of WilL-Actual mental condition of testatrix at 
time of execution of will is the question to be determined on 
a contest based on her alleged incompetency. 
[3] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions-Degree of Proof. 
-To overcome the presumption of sanity, contestant must 
show affirmatively and by a preponderance of the evidence 
that testatrix was of unsound mind at the time she executed 
her will. 
[4] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Particular Circumstances.-Ac-
counts of testatrix' conduct which, at most, show that she 
was ill, weak, highly nervous and excitable, and prone to vio-
lent outbursts of neurotic temper do not tend to prove mental 
degeneration denoting incapacity to understand the testa-
mentary act. 
[ 5] Id.- Testamentary Capacity- Soundness of Mind.- Every 
mental departure from the normal will not destroy a testa-
mentary disposition. 
[6] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Mental Derangement Invalidat-
ing WilL-Mental derangement sufficient to invalidate a will 
must be either insanity of such broad character as to estab-
lish mental incompetency generally, or some specific and nar-
rower form of insanity under which the testatrix is the vic-
tim of some hallucination or delusion. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 10; Am.Jur., Wills, § 78. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 27; [2] Wills, § 14; [3] 
Wills, § 66; [4] Wills, § 32; [5] Wills, § 9; [6] Wills, § 10(1); 
[7] Wills, § 23; [8] Wills, § 33; [9] Wills, § 24; [10] Wills, § 8; 
[11-13] Wills, § 72; [14] Wills, § 140; [15] Wills, § 145; [16] 
Wills, §141; [17,18] Wills, §109; [19] Wills, §77; [20,22,23] 
Wills, §118(1); [21] Wills, §118(3); [24] Wills, §81; [25] 
Wills, § 99; [26] Appeal and Error, § 914. 
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[7] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Suicide of Testatrix.-Fact that 
testatrix committed suicide is relevant on the question of 
sanity, but standing alone it is insufficient to show an insanity 
flO complete~ as to destroy testamentary capacity. 
[8] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Delusions.-Fact that testatrix 
was extremely jealous of, and very much in love with, her 
husband does not show that she suffered from an insane de-
lusion which influenced her will where her jealousy was not 
connected with her testamentary disposition in any way, and 
where, moreover, such jealousy was not a delusion but was 
based on conduct .which had a tendency to create her mo-
mentary beliefs. 
[9] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Beliefs and Prejudices.-Testa-
mentary capacity does not depend on the testatrix' ability 
to reason logically or on her freedom from prejudice; a belief 
may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, therefore, evi-
dence of insanity. 
[10] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Tests.-A testator is of sound 
and disposing mind and memory if, at the time of making his 
will, he has sufficient mental capacity to be able to understand 
the nature of the act he is doing, to understand and recollect 
the nature and situation of his property, and to remember, and 
understand his relations to the persons who have claims on his 
bounty and whose interests are affected by the provisions of 
the instrument. 
[11] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Evidence that testa-
trix set down her wishes in her own handwriting in the form 
of a holographic will, sought legal advice as to whether it 
was a "good will legally," discussed the provisions of the 
will with her attorney, explaining the reason for each of 
them, and after . executing her formal will and leaving the 
attorney's office, she returned and asked him to destroy her 
other will, showed that she comprehended the nature of her 
testamentary act and knew exactly what she was doing. 
[12] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Evidence that testa-
trix understood that, outside of the assets of the law partner-
ship with which her husband was associated, very little would 
pass under her will while he lived, and that she took into 
consideration his life insurance, understood the nature of the 
joint tenancy in their house, and mentioned that she had only 
a joint bank account with him for household purposes, showed 
that she fully comprehended the nature and situation of her 
property. 
[13] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Conceding that tes-
tatrix did not take into consideration the accounts receivable 
of the law firm with which her husband was associated, such 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 39; Am.Jur., Wills, § 80. 
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fact does not show any failure to understand the nature of her 
property where there is evidence that there was a general 
understanding between the two that there wasn't too much 
in the partnership account. 
[14] !d.-Naturalness-Unnaturalness as Bearing on Capacity.-
When mental capacity is the ground of attack of a will, un-
natural provisions of the will are not, in and of themselves, 
evidence of mental incapacity which will overcome the pre-
sumption of sanity and competence. 
[15] !d.-Naturalness-Failure to Provide for Collateral Rela-
tives.-Testimony that when witness asked testatrix shortly 
after her husband's death whether she had notified her brothers, 
she just looked at the witness and said, "I don't know where 
they are," to which she added that she hadn't heard from one 
for seven years, does not show that by failure to provide for 
them in her will she did not have in mind the natural objects 
of her bounty. 
[16] Id.-'--Naturalness-Determination.-Mere fact that will omit-
ted beneficiaries who had been included in earlier wills does 
not show that will was "unnatural," where these beneficiaries 
were not related to testatrix and were not the "natural ob-
jects of her bounty" in the generally accepted sense of the 
term. 
[17] !d.-Undue Influence-Confidential Relations.-N o presump-
tion of undue influence between testatrix and her sister-in-law, 
the principal beneficiary of the will, arises where there is no 
confidential relationship between the two in view of contest-
ant's testimony showing testatrix' distrust and dislike of her· 
sister-in-law. 
[18] !d.-Undue Influence-Confidential Relations.-Neither con-
sanguinity nor affinity of itself creates a fiduciary relation-
ship, and lacking such relationship there is no presumption 
of undue influence. 
[19] Id.-Undue Infiuence-Indicia.-Indieia of undue influence 
include the following: provisions of will are unnatural; its 
dispositions are at variance with testator's intentions, ex-
pressed both before and after its execution; relations existing 
between chief beneficiaries and testator afforded to former 
an opportunity to control testamentary act; testator's mental 
and physical condition was such as to permit a subversion 
of his freedom of will; and chief beneficiaries of will were 
active in procuring instrument to be executed. 
[20] !d.-Undue Influence-Activity of Beneficiary.-Conceding 
that provisions of will were unnatural, that its dispositions 
were at variance with testatrix' preexisting testamentary 111-
[19] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 13; Am.Jur., Wills, § 349. 
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tentions, that the chief beneficiary had an opportunity to sub-
vert testatrix' will, that testatrix' condition was such as to 
permit of subversion of her freedom of will, and that chief 
beneficiary and her husband benefited by provisions of will, 
there is no proof of undue influence where evidence of activity 
by chief beneficiary in procuring execution of will is lacking. 
[21] !d.-Undue Influence-Activity of Beneficiary.-Active par-
ticipation in procuring execution of will cannot be inferred 
from fact that chief beneficiary accompanied testatrix to 
lawyer's office, in the absence of any indication that testatrix 
went there at the beneficiary's instigation or request, or that 
testatrix was not acting entirely in accord with her own 
desire. 
[ 22] Id.- Undue Influence- Activity of Beneficiary.- Inference 
that holographic will was composed during period that chief 
beneficiary was staying with testatrix is not supported in the 
absence of any showing when such will was composed or dated. 
[23] !d.-Undue Influence-Activity of Beneficiary.-Most that 
can be inferred from testimony that testatrix' friends were 
requested by chief beneficiary not to visit her or to talk to 
her on the telephone is that such beneficiary attempted to 
protect testatrix from visitors during a period when she was 
under stress, her husband being seriously ill at the time. 
[24] !d.-Undue Influence-Operation on Testamentary Act.-To 
set aside a will on the ground of undue influence, it is neces-
sary to show that the influence was such as, in effect, to de-
stroy the testator's free agency and substitute for his own 
another person's will. 
[25] !d.-Undue lnfluence-Opportunity.-Mere opportunity to 
influence the mind of testator, even when coupled with an inter-
est or a motive to do so, is insufficient to show undue influence. 
[26] Appeal-DismissaL-Since a ruling denying a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a nonappealable order, 
a purported appeal therefrom will be dismissed. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yuba 
County denying probate of a purported will and from an order 
denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Arthur Coats, 
Judge.* Reversed. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Hewitt & McBride and Greg-
ory Harrison for Appellants. 
Robert W. Steel, Ray Manwell and Erling S. Norby for 
Respondent. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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EDMONDS, .J.--Madge Tucker, sister of Homer Lingen-
felter, proposed for probate the purported will of Vivian 
Lingenfelter, his deceased widow. The contest of Lenore 
DeArmond is based upon the asserted incompetency of the 
testatrix. It is also charged that the will was executed as 
the result of duress and undue influence exercised by the 
proponent and her husband. The appeal is from a judgment 
entered upon a verdict in favor of the contestant and from 
an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 
Homer Lingenfelter was an attorney practicing in partner-
ship with Arthur Powell. On the day Vivian executed the 
purported will, Homer was seriously ill. He died the fol-
lowing day. One week later, Vivian committed suicide. 
Powell was called as a witness by both the proponent and 
the contestant. As Lenore's witness, he testified concerning 
the execution of the will. Vivian came to see him, he said, 
accompanied by Madge, who had been staying with her dur-
ing Homer's illness. Powell was not in his office when the 
two women arrived. Upon his return shortly thereafter, he 
found Vivian and Madge waiting for him in his reception 
room. Powell asked about Homer and Vivian said that he 
looked better. 
Vivian and Powell went into his private office and closed 
the door. Madge remained in the reception room. Vivian 
handed Powell a paper which purported to be her holographic 
will. He testified that she wanted to know ''if it is a good 
will legally." That instrument, he said, made bequests to 
a number of friends and acquaintances. It also included a 
provision for the care of a pet cat. Powell read the docu-
ment aloud. As he mentioned each of its provisions, Vivian 
made some comment, expressing in virtually every instance 
her reasons for the bequest. 
According to Powell, by the document Vivian gave the 
residue of the estate to Madge and her husband. Powell 
testified that when he read that clause, Vivian said, "They 
are only my in laws but they have always helped Homer 
and myself when we have needed them most and they have 
done more for me than my own family ever has.'' 
Powell testified that he called to her attention the omis-
sion of any provision for Homer. Her reply, he said, was 
that, because Homer was so very ill, "she didn't expect him 
to make it and in any event she didn't have much of anything 
of her own.'' The situation, as Powell explained it, was that 
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"wr had reallv written Homer off." Powell also testified 
that Vivian toid him she omitted her brothers from her will 
becausP one had obtained her share of her mother's estate 
and thr othrr was adequately cared for. 
In other conversations related by Powell, he said that they 
discussed her property and Homer's separate property. He 
explained to her that she could will one half of the com-
munity property of herself and Homer. "She understood 
if anything happened to one first the other would get" the 
marital home which was held in joint tenancy. She told 
Powell that she had no bank account of her own, only a 
joint account with Homer for household purposes. They 
also discussed Homer's life insurance. Powell admitted that 
he did not mention the value of the accounts receivable on 
the books of the law partnership. 
In answer to a question whether he believed Vivian was 
capable of writing an introductory clause to a will such 
as that .in the holographic instrument, Powell stated: ''I be-
lieve she could on either of one or two conditions; one if 
Homer had helped her, or two, if she was going by another 
will, but it was pretty letter perfect.'' 
Vivian asked Powell to have the document she had writ-
ten prepared as an attested will, naming Madge as execu-
trix. Certain other minor changes were to be made, such 
as a more specific provision for care of the cat. Powell tes-
tified that he dictated a formal will, using the handwritten 
document and some notes which he had taken during the 
conversation as a memorandum. When testifying, Powell 
co.uld not remember whether the purported holographic will 
had been dated. He also could not recall what he had done 
with that document or with his notes, although he had 
searched for them in his office after Lenore's attorney had 
asked him to preserve ''all Lingenfelter wills.'' 
While the formal will was being prepared, Vivian and 
Madge left the office and walked about town. Upon their 
return, Madge remained in the reception room while Vivian 
went into Powell's private office and executed the will. At 
that time, Powell told the jury, "very definitely" Vivian 
was of sound mind. The other attesting witness to the will 
testified to the same effect. 
A number of witnesses described Vivian as being a highly 
emotional and unstable person. According to the evidence, 
she. would become upset on the slightest provocation. · When 
upset, she would "disintegrate emotionally." She would 
Mar.1952] EsTATE oF LINGENFELTER 
[38 C.2d 571; 241 P.2d 990] 
577 
scream and yell, her eyes would become glassy, she would 
weep uncontrollably and be beyond the reach of reason. She 
could have her mind diverted from whatever was bothering 
her at the moment by talk of something else. 
There is also testimony that Vivian was a person of very 
weak will, easily led and very susceptible to suggestions. 
She was almost completely dependent upon Homer and un-
able to manage for herself her own shopping and ordinary 
routine of life. She could not cope with any unusual situa-
tion such as illness, which demanded extra energy or more 
responsibility, and had to have help to meet it . 
.Among other subjects which seemed to upset Vivian were 
relatives, politics, Franco, Stalin, and the stability of the 
economic system of the world and of the United States. When 
emotionally disturbed, she would become extremely excited 
and abusive of anyone who did not share her views. She 
was jealous of Homer, and during one tantrum of several 
days' duration she procured a gun. Her suspicions of Homer's 
infidelity were unwarranted. 
Dr. Bone, who had treated Vivian as recently as one week 
prior to her execution of the will, testified that she was 
unwell from the time he first knew her. He said she was 
an advanced psychoneurotic and a borderline case between 
sanity and insanity in a medical sense. In his opinion, she 
could be of unsound mind under the stress of excitement, 
anger or fear. Dr. Kimmel, long Vivian's physician, testi-
fied that she was of sound mind, but psychoneurotic to the 
extent of being barely able to manage her household. 
Mrs. Valetta Morton, who saw Vivian between the two 
visits to Powell's office, testified that her conversation at 
that time did not make sense. .As stated by this witness : 
''Well, she was talking about Mr. Lingenfelter being in the 
hospital one minute. Then she asked me to feel her back 
and maybe her neck, and to explain she said she was like 
being in a board, just as stiff as a board, and she said 'I have 
this severe pain in my head at all times.' Then she would 
take her glasses, take them off and put them on and raise 
them up and pull them down, and her eyes looked very 
glassy." In Mrs. Morton's opinion, Vivian was of unsound 
mind at that time. 
Mrs. Norby testified that when she saw Vivian a day or 
two after Homer's death Vivian was very upset. Vivian 
was perspiring, her hands were shaking, she was gray in the 
38 C.2d-19 
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face and hesitant in talking. She cried and hung on to Mrs. 
Nor by and talked "like anyone that is in grief." In the 
opinion of this witness, Vivian had always been of unsound 
mind and was in that condition at the time of the conversa-
tion related to the jury. 
Another of Vivian's friends, Marie Countryman, told of 
attempts to talk with Vivian about the time of Homer's ill-
ness. She stated that while Homer was ill, she tried to call 
Vivian on the telephone. The call was answered by an un-
identified woman, who said "that Vivian was reading or 
was not able to talk.'' After Homer died, the witness called 
at the Lingenfelter home but no one answered the door. She 
again telephoned and the person who answered asked her 
''to wait a while . . . To wait, not to come out.'' A day 
or two after Homer died, Mrs. Norby visited Vivian at her 
home. Also, the day after Homer died, Lenore talked to 
Vivian on the telephone. 
According to several witnesses, Vivian often had stated 
that she considered Madge domineering and greedy. Vivian 
claimed that Madge had gotten the best of a deal with Homer 
in connection with their mother's estate. Two weeks before 
Homer's death, Vivian had said that she did not want Madge 
to come to her home because she was too domineering. There 
is testimony quoting Vivian as saying that the Tuckers con-
sistently were conniving to get the Lingenfelter money. The 
record shows that Vivian expressed her dislike of Madge 
with screaming and yelling. 
Over Madge's objection, evidence was admitted concern-
ing Homer's statements in regard to her and Lenore. This 
testimony was to the effect that Homer considered the Tuckers 
to be ''money minded,'' domineering and completely mer-
cenary. As the witnesses related the conversations, he de-
scribed relations between himself and Madge as a case of 
"dog eat dog," and said that Madge had "hogged their 
father's estate." Homer was very bitter because of Madge's 
treatment of their mother, whom he said she had killed. He 
especially hated Madge's husband, called him names, and 
said that he and Madge never would get a penny of his 
money. 
For many years and at the time of his death, the contestant 
was Homer's secretary. Testimony on her behalf is to the 
effect that he was most appreciative of her services. The 
jury was told of conversations in which Homer had said 
that, when he was starting to practice law, she had worked 
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at a very small salary; she deserved everything he could do 
to help her and Vivian felt the same way. Other statements 
attributed to Homer were that, because Lenore had never 
been paid enough for her services, by his and Vivian's wills 
she would be taken care of and education provided for her 
child. Several witnesses were permitted to testify, over ob-
jection, as to Homer's declarations of his testamentary pro-
visions. 
Lenore testified that in 1937 Vivian executed a will nam-
ing Homer as principal beneficiary. Under this will, the 
contingent beneficiaries were a college, Marie Countryman, . 
and Lenore. The witness also stated that at the same time, 
Homer executed a will naming Vivian as principal bene-
ficiary and Lenore as the sole contingent beneficiary. An-
other will of Vivian's made in 1946, was received in evidence. 
It named as contingent beneficiaries Lenore, Pauline Garewal 
and the college which was a beneficiary under the 1937 will. 
According to the evidence, Vivian often had spoken to 
intimate acquaintances concerning the testamentary provi-
sions she and Homer had made in their various wills. As 
stated by one witness, about two weeks before Homer died, 
Vivian said that her and Homer's wills were written just 
the way they wanted them. Over objections, his will, which 
named Lenore as contingent beneficiary and executrix, was 
admitted into evidence. 
It appears that Madge had visited the Lingenfelters occa-
sionally, and corresponded with Homer, but there is no evi-
denee of eonstant association. On several occasions during 
IIomer's illnesses, Madge came to the Lingenfelters' home 
at their request and helped in caring for Homer and run-
ning the household. By telegram, during Homer's last ill-
ness, Vivian aRked Madge to come for that purpose. Madge 
arrived 10 days before Homer's death and stayed with Vivian 
until shortly before the suicide. 
Upon this and other evidence, the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of Lenore upon each of the two grounds of contest. 
Thereafter a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was denied. The appeal is from the judgment entered 
on the verdict and also from the order denying the motion. 
The proponent of the will asserts that the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict either that Vivian 
was of unsound mind at the time she executed it or that it 
was procured by undue influence. Also, it is claimed that 
prejudicial error resulted from the admission into evidence 
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of Homer's hearsay statements and the certificate showing 
Vivian's brother's commitment to a hospital for mental dis-
eases. Another point relied upon is that Vivian's hearsay 
statements were admitted in evidence to prove the truth of 
facts asserted in such statements. Rulings characterized as 
being prejudicially erroneous concern certain instructions 
which were given to the jury and the refusal of other in-
structions. 
Lenore takes the position that the evidence fully supports 
the jury's verdict upon each ground of contest. She de-
clares that the court correctly ruled upon the admission of 
evidence and the instructions. 
More specifically, IJenore argues, from the evidence the 
jury had a right to believe that Vivian did not comprehend 
the nature of her testamentary act. The record fully sup-
ports the implied finding, it is said, that at the time Vivian 
executed the will she was not aware of the character and 
extent of her property nor did she have in mind the persons 
who were the natural objects of her bounty. 
[la] Accepting that construction of the evidence most 
favorable to Lenore, it shows no lack of testamentary capacity 
at the time of the execution of the will presented for probate. 
There is testimony concerning isolated acts, foibles, idiosyn-
crasies, mental irregularities or departures from the normal 
which do not bear directly upon and influence the testa-
mentary act. But much more than that is required to set 
aside bequests of property. [2,3] "The actual mental condi-
tion of the decedent at the time of the execution of the will 
is the question to be determined upon a contest based on 
his alleged incompetency and evidence tending to show un-
soundness of mind either before or after the execution of 
the will is important only in so far as it tends to show 
mental condition at the time of the execution of the will . 
. . . To overcome the presumption of sanity the contestant 
must show affirmatively and by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the testator was of unsound mind at the time 
he executed his will." (Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 152, 158 
[252 P. 325] .) 
The only testimony bearing upon Vivian's state of mind 
at the time of the execution of the will was that of Powell, 
the attorney who drew the will, and the other attesting wit-
ness. Both declared that Vivian was of sound mind at the 
time of execution of the will. None of the evidence offered 
to support a contrary determination indicates a mental con-
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dition which deprived Vivian of testamentary capacity at 
the time the will was executed. 
[4] 'l'he most that can be drawn from all of the accounts 
of her conduct is that she was ill, weak, highly nervous and 
excitable, and prone to violent outbursts of neurotic temper. 
The acts which led certain witnesses to express the opinion 
that she was of unsound mind had no bearing upon her testa-
mentary capacity. Even Mrs. Morton's description of Vivian 
at a time shortly before the will was executed, shows no more 
than Vivian's nervousness and concern with the health of 
herself and her husband. It does not tend to prove mental 
degeneration denoting incapacity to understand the testa-
mentary act. Mrs. Norby's testimony shows only Vivian's 
deep grief caused by the loss of her husband. 
[5, 6] "Every mental departure from the normal will not 
destroy a testamentary disposition, . . . Mental derangement 
sufficient to invalidate a will must be insanity in one of two 
forms : ( 1) insanity of such broad character as to establish 
mental incompetency generally, or (2) some specific and 
narrower form of insanity under which the testator is the 
victim of some hallucination or delusion. Even in the latter 
class of cases, it is not sufficient merely to establish that a 
testator was the victim of some hallucination or delusion. 
'fhe evidence must establish that the will itself was the crea-
ture or product of such hallucination or delusion; that the 
hallucination or delusion bore directly upon and influenced 
the creation and terms of the testamentary instrument." ( Es-
tate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699, 703-704 [235 P. 45] ; Estate 
of Anwld, 16 Cal.2d 573, 585 [107 P.2d 25] .) 
[lb] "Testamentary capacity cannot be destroyed by show-
ing a few isolated acts, foibles, idiosyncrasies, moral or mental 
irregularities or departures from the normal unless they di-
rectly bear upon and have influenced the testamentary act." 
(Estate of Wright, 7 Cal.2d 348, 356 [60 P.2d 434]; Estate 
of Selb, 84 Cal.App.2d 46, 49 [190 P.2d 277] ; Estate of 
Arnold, supra, p. 586.) [7] The fact that Vivian com-
mitted suicide is relevant upon the question of sanity, but 
standing alone it is insufficient to show an insanity so com-
plete as to destroy testamentary capacity. (Estate of Fink-
ler, 3 Cal.2d 584, 595 [ 46 P .2d 149] ; Estate of Rich, 79 Cal. 
App.2d 22, 30 [179 P.2d 373].) 
[8] Likewise there is no evidence that Vivian suffered 
from an insane delusion which influenced her will. Unques-
tionably she was extremely jealous of, and very much in love 
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with, Homer. According to some witnesses, Homer's teas-
ing occasionally had set Vivian off on one of her rages. At 
other times, coincidental circumstances aroused her jealousy. 
But this jealousy has not been connected with Vivian's testa-
mentary disposition in any way. Moreover, her jealousy was 
not a delusion, for it was based upon conduct which had a 
tendency to create her momentary beliefs. (Estate of Alegria, 
87 Cal.App.2d 645, 655 [197 P.2d 571] .) 
Vivian's other prejudices also fail to establish any de-
lusion. None of them in any way bears upon her testamentary 
disposition. [9] ''Care must be taken to differentiate be-
tween mere unreasonable opinions and mental derangements. 
Testamentary capacity does not depend upon the testatrix' 
ability to reason logically or upon her freedom from preju-
dice. A belief may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, 
therefore, evidence of insanity." (Estate of Perkins, supra, 
p. 708.) 
[10] ''A testator is of sound and disposing mind and 
memory if, at the time of making his will, he has sufficient 
mental capacity to be able to understand the nature of the act 
he is doing, and to understand and recollect the nature and 
situation of his property and to remember, and understand 
his relations to, the persons who have claims upon his bounty 
and whose interests are affected by the provisions of the 
instrument." (Estate of S1nith, S1Lpra; Estate of Arnold, 
supra, p. 586; Estate of Sexton, 199 Cal. 759, 768 [251 P. 
778).) 
[11] A complete answer to the charge that Vivian did 
not comprehend the nature of her testamentary act is the 
uncontradicted evidence showing that she knew exactly what 
she was doing. She set down her wishes in her own hand-
writing in the form of a holographic will. Then she sought 
legal advice as to whether it was a "good will legally." 
She discussed the provisions of the will with her attorney, 
explaining the reason for each of them. After she had ex-
ecuted her formal will and left Powell's office, she returned, 
and asked him to destroy her other will. Nothing in her 
previous or later conduct indicates that, at any time, she 
did not fully understand the consequences of her bequests. 
[12] The record is also without contradiction that Vivian 
fully comprehended the nature and situation of her property. 
The only testimony in this regard is that of Powell. It shows 
that, for a woman unaccustomed to business dealings, she had 
a surprisingly good grasp of her property interests. She 
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understood that, outside of the assets of the law partnership, 
very little would pass under her will while Homer lived. She 
took into consideration the insurance involved. She under-
stood the nature of the joint tenancy in the house. She 
mentioned that she had no bank account of her own, only a 
joint account with Homer for household purposes. 
[13] Lenore argues that Vivian was not aware of the 
character and extent of her property because she did not 
take into consideration the accounts receivable of the law 
firm. Conceding this fact, it does not show any failure to 
understand the nature of her property. In their conversations, 
as recounted by Powell, she said "Homer had told her he 
was drawn up pretty well to take care of his doctor bills and 
expenses and I mentioned I had been drawing up pretty well 
also because I was building a home, and the general under-
standing was that there wasn't too much in the partnership 
account.'' 
Powell testified: "Personally, I forgot to mention anything 
about the accounts receivable and didn't consider them or 
anything like that, and I had no reason to go ahead and 
estimate them because they weren't due." Apparently Powell 
was exceedingly generous in his inclusion in Homer's estate 
of accounts receivable which were not earned until a consider-
able period of time following Homer's death. That Vivian 
failed to estimate with detailed accuracy the value of ac-
counts receivable which were largely unearned at the time 
does not show that she lacked understanding of her interest 
in the partnership to the extent of the community property 
involved. The ve'ry discussion of the standing of the partners' 
drawing accounts indicates that she considered the partnership 
interest in making her will. 
Lenore also points to the omission from the will of pro-
vision for Homer and for Vivian's brothers as proof that 
Vivian did not have in mind the persons who were the 
natural objects of her bounty. [14] However, as was said 
in Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal.App.2d 738, 741 [78 P.2d 456], the 
"unnatural" provisions of a will are "an element supporting 
an in{e1·ence of undue influence when the testament is at-
tacked on that ground, and (are) of like value when it is 
claimed that the testator was laboring under hallucinations 
which had caused him to make an unreasonable or unjust 
discrimination against some of his heirs at law. But, when 
mental incapacity is the ground of attack, the dispository 
clauses of the will are not, in and of themselves, evidenve of 
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mental incapacity which would overcome the presumption of 
sanity and competence.'' 
When Vivian discussed the provisions of her proposed 
will with Powell, she told him that she made no provision 
for Homer because she did not expect him to live long. Powell 
mentioned her brothers. Vivian answered, "You know how 
I feel about Waldo after he got my share of my mother's 
estate." As to Earl, she said that he was taken care of. As 
Powell knew, Earl was an incompetent in a Veterans' Ad-
ministration hospital. 
[15] Lenore points to the testimony of Anne Norby as 
proof that Vivian did not have in mind the natural objects 
of her bounty. Concerning a conversation with Vivian a 
day or two after Homer's death, Mrs. Norby said that she 
asked whether Vivian had notified her brothers. According 
to Mrs. Norby, "she just looked at me and said, 'I don't 
know where they are.' She added that she hadn't heard from 
one for seven years.'' Such testimony does not show that 
Vivian did not have her brothers in mind. At most, it ex-
plains in part her failure to provide for them and indicates 
that there was an estrang·ement of long standing. 
[16] Lenore further argues that the will was "unnatural" 
because it omitted beneficiaries who had been included in 
earlier wills. These beneficiaries were not related to Vivian, 
and were not the "natural objects of her bounty" in the 
generally accepted sense of the term. That Vivian changed 
her will, as she had a right to do, is not evidence of mental 
incapacity, although her act in that regard may be relevant 
upon the issue of undue influence. At most, this change is 
''an additional circumstance entitled to some weight in connec-
tion with the other facts shown.'' (Estate of Strachan, 166 
CaL 162, 166 [135 P. 296] .) 
[17] Upon the issue of undue influence, it is argued that 
Vivian's cond~tion was such as to permit a subversion of her 
freedom of will, that Madge had an opportunity to control 
the testamentary act and was active in procuring the execution 
of the will, that the provisions of the will are unnatural and 
at variance with preexisting testamentary intentions, and that 
the Tuckers benefited unduly by the provisions of the will. 
Again accepting as true all of the evidence most favorable to 
Lenore's position, there was no confidential relationship be-
tween Vivian and Madge. Lenore does not claim that there 
was such relationship, and, in view of the testimony which 
Lenore introduced showing Vivian's distrust and dislike of 
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Madge, Lenore could not well claim that a confidential relation-
ship existed. (Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 534, 562 
[189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419].) [18] Consanguinity of itself 
does not create a fiduciary relationship. (Estate of Llewellyn, 
supra.) A like rule must apply to affinity. Lacking any 
confidential relationship, there is no presumption of undue 
influence. 
[19] The indicia of undue influence have been stated as 
follows: " ( 1) The provisions of the will were unnatural. . . . 
(2) the dispositions of the will were at variance with the in-
tentions of the decedent, expressed both before and after 
its execution; ( 3) the relations existing between the chief 
beneficiaries and the decedent afforded to the former an 
opportunity to control the testamentary act; ( 4) the decedent's 
mental and physical condition was such as to permit a sub-
version of his freedom of will ; and ( 5) the chief beneficiaries 
under the will were active in procuring the instrument to be 
executed." (Estate of Yale, 214 Cal. 115, 122 [4 P.2d 153].) 
These, coupled with a confidential relationship between at 
least one of the chief beneficiaries and the testator, altogether 
were held ''sufficient to shift the burden to the proponents 
of the will to establish an absence of undue influence and coer-
cion and to require the issues to be determined by the jury." 
(Estate of Yale, supra, p. 123.) 
In Estate of Graves, 202 Cal. 258, 262 [259 P. 935], it was 
said that the following facts, among others, are recognized 
as indicative of undue influence: "The relations between 
appellant and the decedent afforded to appellant an oppor-
tunity to control the testamentary act; the decedent's con-
dition was such as to permit of a subversion of her freedom 
of will; the appellant was active in procuring the instrument 
to be executed. In addition, appellant unduly profited as 
beneficiary under the will. While none of these circumstances, 
standing alone, has the effect of creating a presumption against 
the validity of the instrument, their probative force, in com-
bination, is to impose upon the proponent the obligation of 
presenting evidence of volition, and to make the question as to 
undue influence one of fact for the jury's determination." 
[20] Conceding that the provisions of Vivian's will were 
unnatural, that its dispositions were at variance with Vivian's 
preexisting testamentary intentions, that Madge had an op-
portunity to subvert Vivian's will and that Vivian's condition 
was such as to permit o£ a subversion ·of her freedom of will, 
and that Madge and her husband benefited by the provisions 
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of the will, there still is no proof of undue influence. Evi-
dence of activity by Madge in procuring execution of the 
will is entirely lacking. 
[21.] Active participation in procuring the execution of 
the will cannot be inferred from the fact that Madge ac-
companied Vivian to Powell's office, in the absence of any 
indication that Vivian went there at Madge's instigation or 
request, or that Vivian was not acting entirely in accord with 
her own desire. (Estate of 111orcel, 162 Cal. 188, 197 [121 
P. 733] ; Estate of Easton, 140 Cal.App. 367, 376 [35 P.2d 
614] .) [22] Lenore suggests that the purported holographic 
will which Vivian took to Powell had been dictated by Madge. 
In that connection she points to Powell's opinion that its 
legal sufficiency was beyond Vivian's capacity and assumes 
that the will was written after Homer was admitted to the 
hospital. The inference that the holographic will was com-
posed during the period that Madge was staying with Vivian 
has no support whatever in the evidence. There is no show-
ing as to when the holographic will was composed or dated. 
[23] Lenore also points to testimony that Vivian's friends 
were requested by Madge not to visit her or to talk to her on 
the telephone as evidence of Madge's activity in procuring the 
will. The most that can be inferred from the testimony is that 
Madge attempted to protect Vivian from visitors during a 
period when she was under stress. Vivian did have visitors, 
and did talk to callers on the telephone. Once, Madge sug-
gested to a caller that she should "wait a while" before visit-
ing. At one time, a visitor found no one at home, or a tele-
phone call was unanswered. There is no testimony that any 
friend was flatly denied permission to see or talk to Vivian. 
[24, 25] To overturn a will on the ground of undue influ-
ence, not only must there be evidence of activity on the part of 
the beneficiary, it also ''is necessary to show that the influence 
was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator's free agency and 
substitute for his own another person's will .... Evidence 
must be produced that pressure was brought to bear directly 
upon the testamentary act ... mere opportunity to influence 
the mind of the testator, even coupled with an interest or a 
motive to do so, is not sufficient." (Estate of Arnold, supra, 
p. 577.) 
''The unbroken rule in this state is that the courts must 
refuse to set aside the solemnly executed will of a deceased 
person upon the ground of undue influence unless there be 
proof of 'a pressure which overpowered the mind and bore 
Mar.1952] ESTATE OF LINGENFELTER 
[38 C.2d 571; 241 P.2d 990] 
587 
down the volition of the testator at the very time the will 
was made.' " (Estate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765 [130 P. 
872]; Estate of Carithers, 156 Cal. 422, 428 [105 P. 127].) 
No such showing is made by the evidence in this case. 
[26] The ruling denying the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict being a nonappealable order, the 
purported appeal therefrom is dismissed. (Estate of Green, 
25 Cal.2d 535, 545 [154 P.2d 692] ; Estate of Frank, 102 Cal. 
App.2d 126, 132 [226 P.2d 767]; Prob. Code, § 1240.) The 
judgment denying probate of the proposed will is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In my view the evidence is not 
as a matter of law insufficient to sustain the verdict. The 
jury were not, as it seems to me the majority opinion indicates, 
bound to accept as true the evidence favoring the proponent. 
Disregarding the evidence favoring the proponent, insofar as 
there is impeachment or conflict, and construing all of the 
evidence and drawing all permissible inferences in favor of 
the contestant, I think the jury were justified in believing 
that the will as offered was not the free, voluntary and rational 
act of a competent testatrix. The majority opinion, I think, 
impliedly accepts as true all evidence favoring the proponent 
and unduly limits the inferences which may (and should 
properly) be drawn in favor of supporting the verdict. 
For instance, the testimony that Vivian was a highly 
emotional and unstable person who on the slightest provoca-
tion would become upset, "disintegrate emotionally," scream 
and yell, and be beyond the reach of reason ; that she was of 
very weak will, easily led and very susceptible to suggestions ; 
that she was an advanced psychoneurotic and borderline case 
between sanity and insanity in a medical sense, and could be of 
unsound mind under the stress of excitement, anger or fear; 
that on the same day as, and at a time between, the two 
visits to Powell's office her conversation did not make sense, 
her eyes looked glassy, and in the witness' opinion she was of 
unsound mind; that in another witness' opinion Vivian was 
of unsound mind and was in that condition a day or two 
after Homer's death; that Vivian often had stated and indi-
cated her dislike for the Tuckers, and had said the Tuckers 
were conniving to get the Lingenfelter money; that she had 
been dependent upon her husband, Homer, not only in mat-
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ters of business but in the ordinary routine of life; that she 
could not cope with any unusual situation, such as illness; 
that at the time of execution of the disputed will Homer was, 
. and was known by Vivian to be, in his last illness; coupled 
with the facts that Madge Tucker had been staying with 
Vivian during Homer's illness, that she prevented friends from 
contacting Vivian during the critical period, that she ac-
companied Vivian on both of the visits to Powell's office, and 
that the provisions of the will here involved were contrary 
to those of prior wills made by Vivian and Homer and con-
trary to their oft-expressed plans and contrary to a statement 
by Vivian made only two weeks before Homer's death (and 
four days prior to Madge's arrival and opportunity for con-
tinuing influence) that their wills were just as they wanted 
them, all considered together, in my view supports permis-
sible inferences that Vivian was not fully competent to make a 
valid will, was susceptible to influence and was unduly in-
fluenced by Madge, and that the will in question was not 
Vivian's free, voluntary and rational act. If, as the medical 
expert testified, she could be of unsound mind under the 
stress of excitement or fear, it would be logical that such 
condition obtained during the days of Homer's last illness; 
surely the stress of that period (which culminated in her 
making the disputed will and committing suicide) was more 
than the ''slight provocation'' which ordinarily caused her to 
"disintegrate emotionally" and be "beyond the reach of 
reason.'' 
Because under the circumstances of this case no useful 
purpose would be served by discussing in this dissent issues 
of law not relied upon in the majority opinion I do not con-
sider them. 
Upon the issues discussed in the majority opinion I would 
resolve the conflict in favor of sustaining the verdict and 
affirm the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with Mr. Justice Schauer that the evidence produced 
at the trial of this case is sufficient to sustain the findings of 
the jury that decedent was of unsound mind at the time the 
will in question was executed and that the execution of the 
will was the result of the undue influence of appellants. 
It should be remembered that in this case we have not 
only the verdict of the jury holding the will invalid on both 
the above mentioned grounds but we have the rulings of 
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the trial judge denying, :first, a motion for a nonsuit; second, 
a motion for a directed verdict; third, a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict; and fourth, a motion for a new 
trial. vV e also have the unanimous opinion of the District 
Court of Appeal holding that the evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the :finding of unsoundness of mind but that the evidence 
is insufficient as a matter of law to support the :finding of 
undue influence. (See Estate of Lingenfelter, decided July 12, 
1951 *(Cal.App.) 234 P.2d 125.) Now a majority of this 
court holds that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 
to sustain the :finding of either unsoundness of mind or of 
undue influence. In so holding the majority of this court has, 
in my opinion, gone farther in this case than in any other re-
ported decision in usurping the function of the triers of fact, 
and has in effect placed itself in the position of the trier of 
fact in weighing the evidence and passing upon the credi-
bility of the witnesses. 
A statute of this state expressly provides that: "Any issue 
of fact involving . . . the due execution and attestation of 
the will, or any other question substantially affecting the 
validity of the will, must be tried by a jury unless a jury is 
waived. . . . " (Italics added.) (Pro b. Code, § 371.) The 
force and effect of this statute was recently emphasized by a 
unanimous decision of this court in the case of Swift v. 
Superior Court, S. F. No. 18503, decided March 7, 1952. But 
of what value is the right to have an issue of fact tried by 
a jury if a majority of this court is to usurp the function of 
the jury in weighing the evidence· and passing upon the 
credibility of the witnesses as this court has done in this case? 
The answer is obvious. The effect of the majority decision 
in this case makes the above cited statute a dead letter, and 
emphasizes the oft-repeated statement by critics of our judicial 
system that the result in any case depends not upon the law 
as declared by the Legis]ature or prior decisions -of the courts, 
but upon the philosophy or point of view of the majority who 
compose the court of last resort. In other words, we have 
a government of men and not of law. 
I have heretofore stated that the majority decision in this 
case goes farther in disregarding the determination of the 
fact :finding body than any other decision because it not only 
nullifies the determination of the jury that Vivian Lingen-
felter was of unsound mind when she executed the will in 
*A hearing by the Supreme Court was granted on Sept. 7, 1951. 
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question and was acting under the undue influence of the 
appellants, but it also disregards the rulings of the trial judge 
sustaining those findings and the holding of the District Court 
of Appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
finding of unsoundness of mind. 
Without attempting to review all of the decisions of this 
court and the District Courts of Appeal which have refused 
to sustain. the findings of juries that wills executed by testa-
tors were invalid because of their unsoundness of mind or 
were procured by undue influence, my review of these de-
cisions discloses that in almost every case where this court 
has refused to accept the determination of the jury in cases 
such as this, either the trial court had granted a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or the District Court 
of Appeal had reversed a judgment based upon a jury verdict 
vacating and setting aside the will. In Estate of Arnold, 
16 Cal.2d 573 [107 P.2d ·25], the trial court had granted a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District 
Court of Appeal affirmed and this court likewise affirmed by 
a divided court. The same is true of Estate of Finkler, 3 Cal. 
2d 584 [ 46 P.2d 149]. In Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 
534 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419], Estate of Russell, 80 Cal. 
App.2d 711 [182 P.2d 318], Estate of Agnew, 65 Cal.App.2d 
553 [151 P.2d 126] and Estate of Hopkins, 136 Cal.App. 590 
[29 P.2d 249], this court denied petitions for a hearing after 
a unanimous decision by the District Court of Appeal reversing 
the judgment in each of said cases. In Estate of Wright, 7 
Cal.2d 348 [60 P.2d 434], this court by a bare majority of 
four justices reversed a judgment holding a will invalid on 
the sole ground of testamentary incapacity where the trial 
court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict which determined that the dec.eased was of unsound 
mind at the time the will was executed. All of the foregoing 
cases hold that the evidence upon which the verdict was based 
was insufficient to show either unsoundness of mind or undue 
influence, although, to my mind, the conclusion reached by 
this court in each of said cases was based upon reasoning in 
conflict with the general rule that in cases where a trial by 
jury is a matter of right, all questions as to the weight of 
evidence and credibility of witnesses are within the sole pro-
vince of the jury. There can be no doubt that the trend of 
decision both by this court and the District Courts of Appeal 
in will contest cases has been in direct conflict with the last 
mentioned settled rule which is generally applied in cases 
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other than those involving a wm contest. Yet, we find in 
nearly every decision of this court and the District Courts of 
Appeal in will contest cases the statement that the appellate 
courts of this state are bound by the conflict of evidence rule 
and that questions as to the weight of the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses are for the determination of the 
trier of fact. I think that any unbiased mind after reviewing 
these decisions will agree with me that in the decisions above 
referred to the conflict of evidence rule has not been applied 
and that this court and the District Courts of Appeal in 
deciding those cases have simply given lip service to that 
rule and then disregarded it in reaching its conclusion. Such 
is the situation in the case at bar. 
Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d 384], marks a clear 
departure from the rule followed in the cases hereinabove 
cited and similar cases. In the last cited case this court said, 
at page 525: "Proponent on the other hand produced an 
array of witnesses who testified as to the soundness of de-
cedent's mind and contradicted other evidence offered by 
contestant. Attorneys with whom decedent consulted during 
1940 regarding the disposition of her property including Mr. 
Ricks, the draftsman of the will, and other persons acquainted 
with her, testified that her mind was sound. Evidence is 
pointed to which it is asserted explains the instances of de-
cedent's conduct above referred to. The value or credibility 
of those explanations was for the trier of fact. Reference is 
made to evidence that she handled her first husband's busi-
ness affairs for many years, he being blind, and that she was 
a careful and cautious business woman. To review those 
conflicts is not the function of this court. The trier of fact 
is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence 
in a will contest the same as in any other case. (Estate of 
Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689] ; Estate of Miller, 16 
Cal.App.2d 154 [60 P.2d 498] ; Estate of Ramey, 62 Cal.App. 
413 [217 P. 135]; Estate of Gill, 14 Cal.App.2d 526 [58 P.2d 
734]; Estate of Doolittle, 153 Cal. 29 [94 P. 240]; Estate of 
Snowball, 157 Cal. 301 [107 P. 598] ; Estate of Cashion, 27 
Cal.App.2d 689 [81 P.2d 628]; Estate of Allan, 15 Cal.App. 
2d 272 [59 P.2d 425]; Estate of Caspar, 172 Cal. 147 [155 
P. 631] ; Estate of Arnold, 147 Cal. 583 [82 P. 252] ; Estate 
of Webster, 43 Cal.App.2d 6 [110 P.2d 81, 111 P.2d 355] ; 
Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641 [250 P. 676]; Estate of Johnson, 
200 Cal. 299 [252 P. 1049] ; Estate of Barr, 69 Cal.App. 16 
[230 P. 181]; Estate of Russell, 189 Cal. 759 [210 P. 249] .) 
592 ESTATE OF LINGENFELTER [38 C.2d 
An excellent statement of the rule appears in Estate of Bristol, 
snpra. Although the issue was whether a codicil had been 
destroyed by the testator, the general rule is stated at page 
223: ' 
'' 'The rules of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the 
evidence, and the province of a reviewing court, are the same 
in a will contest as in any other civil case. . . . The rule as 
to our province is: ''In reviewing the evidence . . . all con-
flicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all 
legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold 
the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of 
law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, 
the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a de-
termination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, 
contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the con-
clusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences 
can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court 
is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the 
trial court." (Italics added.) ... The rule quoted is as 
applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when 
considering a jury's verdict. The critical word in the defini- · 
tion is ''substantial'' ; it is a door which can lead as readily 
to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice.' 
''A somewhat different theory was expressed in Estate of 
Oasarotti, 184 Cal. 73, 78 [192 P. 1085], where this court 
said: ''l'he testimony of proponent's witnesses must be taken 
into account in weighing the sufficiency of contestant's case. 
Evidence which standing by itself might be sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict may in the light of all the facts be wholly 
inadequate, and that without invading the province of the 
jury as the judges of the weight and sufficiency of the evi-
dence.' This statement was quoted in Estate of McDonough, 
200 Cal. 57 [251 P. 916]. The last quoted excerpt cannot 
be considered as an accurate statement of the law inasmuch as 
it is contrary to the foregoing declaration in Estate of Bristol, 
supra, which has been announced so frequently that it must 
be considered as controlling. Of course, all of the evidence 
must be examined, but it is not weighed. All of the evidence 
most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, 
and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity 
to be accepted by the trier of fact. If the evidence so viewed 
is sufficient as a matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed.'' 
I submit that the majority opinion in the case at bar is in 
direct conflict with the foregoing declaration by this court. 
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As Mr. Justice Schauer has made a correct summation of 
the evidence in his dissenting opinion in this case I shall 
not attempt to do so, but wish to add my unqualified con-
currence with his statement that the evidence disclosed by the 
record is amply sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury 
as to the invalidity of the will. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment denying probate of 
the will here involved. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 3, 
1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18431. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1952.] 
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